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Abstract
Enabling machines to legal balancing is a non-trivial task
challenged by a multitude of factors some of which are ad-
dressed and explored in this work. We propose a holistic ap-
proach to formal modeling at different abstraction layers sup-
ported by a pluralistic framework in which the encoding of an
ethico-legal value and upper ontology is developed in com-
bination with the exploration of a formalization logic, with
legal domain knowledge and with exemplary use cases un-
til a reflective equilibrium is reached. Our work is enabled
by a meta-logical approach to universal logical reasoning and
it applies the recently introduced LogiKEy methodology for
designing normative theories for ethical and legal reasoning.
The particular focus in this paper is on the formalization and
encoding of a value ontology suitable e.g. for explaining and
resolving legal conflicts in property law (wild animal cases).
1 Introduction
Law today has to reflect highly pluralistic environments.
There are plural values, world-views, and logics which may
even be considered as constituting plural worlds. One func-
tion of modern, reflexive law is to enable the social interac-
tion within and between such plural worlds (Teubner 1983;
Lomfeld 2017). Any sound model of legal reasoning needs
to be pluralistic while at the same time reflecting the uniting
force of law.
Logical reconstructions of legal reasoning quite often sep-
arate deductive rule application and legal interpretation, cf.
the overview in (Prakken and Sartor 2015). Yet, understand-
ing legal reasoning as practical argumentation (Alexy 1978),
this separation breaks down. Nonetheless different types of
rule-based (Hage 1997), case-based (Horty 2011) and value-
based (Bench-Capon et al. 2005) reasoning remain. A dis-
course theory of law could integrate these different types by
translating legal reasoning into the balancing of plural and
opposing socio-legal values (Lomfeld 2015).
There are several models to quantify legal balancing, e.g.
(Alexy 2003; Sartor 2010). Nonetheless, these approaches
need to get “integrated with logic and argumentation to pro-
vide a comprehensive account of value-based reasoning”
(Sartor 2018). An adequate balancing model of legal rea-
soning, thus, has to reconstruct rule subsumption and case
interpretation as argumentation process between conflicting
values. Here, the differentiation of legal norms into rules
and principles reveals its potential (Alexy 2000). Legal prin-
ciples could be understood as material values on a deep level
of legal balancing, which is structured by legal rules on an
explicit upper level of legal reasoning (Lomfeld 2015).
Within the recent AI & Law perspective value conflicts
are often modeled according to Dung’s abstract argumen-
tation (Dung 1995) as a value argumentation framework
(Bench-Capon et al. 2005). Yet, if preferences between de-
feasible rules are reconstructed and justified in terms of pref-
erences between values, some questions about values nec-
essarily pop up: “Are values scalar? [. . . ] Can values be
ordered at all? [. . . ] How can sets of values be compared?
[. . . ] Can several less important values together overcome a
more important value?” (Bench-Capon and Sartor 2003).
Thus, an encompassing approach for legal reasoning as
practical argumentation needs not only a formal reconstruc-
tion of the relation between legal values (principles) and le-
gal rules, but also a value ontology that allows to system-
atize value comparison and conflicts as “discoursive gram-
mar” (Lomfeld 2015; Lomfeld 2019).
In this paper we demonstrate how an abstract level en-
coding and automation of an ethico-legal value ontology,
i.e. Lomfeld’s “discoursive grammar” of justification, can
be achieved by reusing and extending the LogiKEy method-
ology and formal framework (Benzmu¨ller et al. 2020).
This framework works with shallow semantical embeddings
(SSEs) of (combinations of) non-classical logics in classical
higher-order logic (HOL). HOL thereby serves as a meta-
logic, rich enough to support the encoding of a plurality of
“object logics” (e.g. conditional, deontic or epistemic logics
and combinations thereof) and plural and adaptable value
systems. The embedded “object logics” are used for the it-
erative, experimental encoding of normative theories, which
finally help to reason with concrete legal cases utilizing the
encoded value system. This reflects ideas of understanding
the solution of legal cases as theory construction, “build-
ing, evaluating and using theories” (Bench-Capon and Sar-
tor 2003).1 This multi-layered knowledge engineering pro-
cess is supported in our framework by adapting automated
1They quote e.g. McCarty (1995, p285): “The task for a lawyer
or a judge in a ‘hard case’ is to construct a theory of the disputed
rules that produces the desired legal result, and then to persuade
the relevant audience that this theory is preferable to any theories



















theorem proving (ATP) technology for meta-logic HOL.
Ethico-legal ontologies also constitute a core ingredient
to enable the computation, assessment and communication
of abstract-level justifications in the future ethico-legal gov-
ernance of AI (Benzmu¨ller and Lomfeld 2020). A sound
implementation of any legally accountable “moral machine”
requires the development of upper-level ontologies to guide
and connect the encoding of concrete regulatory codes
(Hoekstra et al. 2009; Fuenmayor and Benzmu¨ller 2019b)
or legal cases. Understanding legal reasoning as con-
flictual practical argumentation, the plural interpretation of
these concrete legal rules requires a complementary abstract
ethico-legal value ontology, for example, as a “discoursive
grammar” of justification (Lomfeld 2019).
The contributions of this paper are manifold: After
summarizing Lomfeld’s value ontology, resp. “discoursive
grammar” of justification, in §2, and briefly depicting the
LogiKEy development and knowledge engineering method-
ology in §3, we outline our object logic of choice – the pref-
erence logic by van Benthem et al. (2009) – in §4. In this sec-
tion we then present, as our first main contribution, a seman-
tical embedding of this preference logic in the Isabelle/HOL
proof assistant (Nipkow et al. 2002), and we test and assess
its meta-theory with state-of-the-art ATP technology. Sub-
sequently we encode in §5, as our second main contribution,
Lomfeld’s value ontology, which is again extensively tested
and assessed with ATP systems. Further relevant legal and
world knowledge is modeled and added in §6, and then it is
demonstrated in §7 how the introduced and formalized (gen-
eral) knowledge can be used for automatically generating
value-oriented computer explanations for exemplary prop-
erty law (“wild animal”) cases. §8 concludes the paper.
Formalization sources are available at http://logikey.org
under “Preference-Logics/vanBenthemEtAl2009.”
2 “Discoursive Grammar” of Justification
Combining the discourse theoretical idea that legal reason-
ing is practical argumentation with a two-level model of le-
gal norms, legal “rules” could be reconstructed as condi-
tional preference relations between conflicting underlying
value “principles” (Alexy 2000; Lomfeld 2015). The le-
gal consequence of a rule R implies the value preference
of value principle A over value principle B: A > B (e.g.
health security outweighs freedom to move).2 This value
preference applies under the condition that the norm ele-
ments E1 and E2 which the rule denotes as prerequisites
are met. Thus, if E1 and E2 are satisfied (e.g. a virus pan-
demic occurs and voluntary shut down fails), then A > B
which justifies the rule’s legal consequence (e.g. sanctioned
lock-down). We thus have a conditional preference relation
R : (E1 ∧ E2)→ A > B
But which value principles are to be balanced? How to
find a suitable justification framework? Based on compara-
tive discourse analyses in different legal systems, one could
reconstruct a general dialectical taxonomy of legal value
2In §5 these values will be assigned to particular parties/actors,
i.e. ruling for different parties may promote different values.
Figure 1: Value ontology by (Lomfeld 2019)
principles used in (at least Western) legislation, legislative
materials, cases, textbooks and scholar writings (Lomfeld
2015). The idea is to provide a consistent systematic value
ontology of legal principles independent of concrete cases
or legal fields to justify legal decisions.
The proposed legal value ontology, see Fig. 1, is consis-
tent with similar taxonomies of political and economic val-
ues (Lomfeld 2019). In all these social systems one could
observe a general antinomy between individual and collec-
tive values. Ideal types of this basic dialectic are the value of
FREEDOM for the individual and the value of SECURITY
for the collective perspective. Another classic social value
antinomy is between a functional (economic) and a more
idealistic viewpoint, represented in the ethical debate by the
value dialectic of UTILITY versus EQUALITY. These four
normative poles stretch an axis of value coordinates for the
general set construction.
Within this dialectical matrix eight more concrete le-
gal values/principles are identified. FREEDOM represents
the normative value of individual autonomy and comprises
the legal principles of more functional individual choice or
‘free will’ (WILL) and more idealistic (self-)‘responsibility’
(RESP). The value of SECURITY addresses the collective
dimension of public order and comprises the legal principles
of more functional collective ‘stability’ (STAB) of a social
system and more idealistic social trust or ‘reliance’ (RELI).
The value of UTILITY means economic welfare on the per-
sonal and collective level and comprises the legal principles
of collective overall welfare-maximization, i.e. ‘efficiency’
(EFFI) and individual welfare-maximization, i.e. economic
benefit or ‘gain’ (GAIN). Finally, EQUALITY represents
the normative ideal of equal treatment and equal allocation
of resources and comprises the legal principles of more indi-
vidual equal opportunity or procedural ‘fairness’ (FAIR) and
more collective distributional equality or ‘equity’ (EQUI).
This legal value ontology could consistently cover exist-
ing value sets from law & logic (or AI & Law) accounts
on value-based reasoning, e.g. (Berman and Hafner 1993;
Bench-Capon 2012; Gordon and Walton 2012; Sartor 2010),
mostly modeled in connection with so-called “wild animal
cases” or succeeding common law property cases.
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3 Methodology
The LogiKEy methodology (Benzmu¨ller et al. 2020) refers
to the principles underlying the organization and the conduct
of a complex knowledge design and engineering process—
which is what we are faced with. Design means the depic-
tion of the main features of the system we want to achieve,
and (knowledge or logic) engineering refers to all the tech-
nical and scientific aspects involved in building, maintaining
and using a knowledge-based, resp. logic-based, system.
LogiKEy’s unifying formal framework is based on (shal-
low) semantical embeddings (SSEs) of ‘object’ logics into
a higher-order meta-logic (HOL), which enables the provi-
sion of powerful tool support: off-the-shelf theorem provers
and model finders for HOL are assisting the LogiKEy knowl-
edge engineer to flexibly experiment with underlying logics
and their combinations, with (legal & world) general and
domain knowledge, and with concrete use cases—all at the
same time. Continuous improvements of these off-the-shelf
provers, without further ado, leverage the reasoning perfor-
mance in LogiKEy.
In our context, the knowledge engineering task is facing
the layers as depicted in Fig. 2: meta-logic HOL enables
the encoding of a preference logic, followed by the value
ontology, both of which are then used for formalizing legal
& world knowledge, before concrete wild animal use cases
are modeled and assessed.
The engineering process at these layers has backtracking
points and several work cycles may be required; thereby
the higher layers may also pose modification requests to the
lower layers. Such requests may, unlike in most other ap-
proaches, also include far-reaching modifications of the cho-
sen logical foundations, e.g. in the adopted particular pref-
erence logic. The work we present in this paper is in fact the
result of an iterative, give-and-take process encompassing
several cycles of modeling, assessment and testing activi-
ties, whereby a (modular) logical theory gradually evolves
until eventually reaching a state of highest coherence and
acceptability. We then speak of arriving at a reflective equi-
librium, cf. previous work on computational hermeneutics
(Fuenmayor and Benzmu¨ller 2019a).
LogiKEy thus supports empirical studies on ethico-legal
theories in which the underlying logic formalisms itself can
be flexibly varied, assessed and compared in context.
Wild Animal Use Cases









Figure 2: LogiKEy development methodology
4 Preference Logic
Adopting the LogiKEy methodology, the first question to
address is: Which preference logic to choose (initially)?
Preference logics generally aim at an adequate modeling
of preference reasoning of an (idealized) rational individ-
ual. Hence, the logic we choose needs to provably sup-
port relevant criteria (e.g., strengthening/weakening the ate-
cedent/consequent). Our initial choice has been the prefer-
ence logic by van Benthem et al. (2009), abbreviated by PL
in the remainder: PL is a “modal logic for ceteris paribus
preferences understood in the sense of ‘all other things being
equal’. This reading goes back to the seminal work of Von
Wright in the early 1960’s and has returned in computer sci-
ence in the 1990’s and in more abstract ‘dependency logics’
today.” PL appears suited for effective automation using the
SSEs approach, which has been another selection criterion.
This judgment is based on good prior experience with SSEs
of related logics whose semantics employs accessibility re-
lations between possible worlds/states, just as PL does. In-
teresting alternatives to PL include the preference logics by
Liu (2008) and Osherson and Weinstein (2012).
PL may be criticized as an overly complex choice for
our aims as presented in §7, where the automation of ceteris
paribus reasoning has hardly been addressed yet (but will
be in future work). Anyhow, we may always ‘downgrade’
our choice of logic if that is needed by e.g. practical perfor-
mance considerations, or we may ‘upgrade’ or combine it
with other logics if required. Remember that the choice of
formalization logic is a parameter in the LogiKEy approach.
Automating Preference Logic PL
For the mechanization and automation of PL we utilize the
SSE technique, which encodes the language constituents of
an object logic, PL in our case, as expressions (λ-terms) in
HOL. This shows that PL is just a fragment of HOL and can
be automated as such. A core idea is to model (relevant parts
of) the semantic structures of PL explicitly in HOL. For PL
these structures are relational frames constituted by sets of
possible worlds/states and their accessibility relations. PL
propositions can thus be encoded in the SSE as predicates in
HOL taking possible worlds/states as arguments.
The SSE of the basic operators of preference logic PL in
HOL is depicted in Fig. 3; this encoding is further explained
below. Further extensions to support ceteris paribus reason-
ing in PL are presented in Fig. 9 in Appx. A.1.
As a result we obtain a combined, interactive and auto-
mated, theorem prover and model finder for PL realized
within Isabelle/HOL. This is a new contribution, since we
are not aware of any other existing implementation and au-
tomation of PL. Moreover, as we will demonstrate be-
low, the SSE technique supports the automated assessment
of meta-logical properties of the embedded logic in Is-
abelle/HOL, which in turn provides practical evidence for
the correctness of our encoding. A formal proof of the faith-
fulness (soundness & completeness) of the SSE is analogous
to numerous prior works, cf. Benzmu¨ller (2019) and the ref-
erences therein.
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Figure 3: SSE of PL (Benthem et al. 2009) in HOL
SSE of PL in HOL We comment on the implementation
of the SSE of PL in Isabelle/HOL as displayed in Fig. 3; see
van Benthem et al. (2009) for further details on PL.
First, a new base type i is declared (Line 7), denoting the
set of possible worlds or states. Subsequently (Lines 8–12),
useful type abbreviations are introduced, including the type
σ for PL propositions, which are modeled as predicates on
objects of type i (i.e. as truth-sets of worlds/states). A bet-
terness relation , and its strict variant ≺, are introduced
(Lines 14–15), with-accessible worlds interpreted as those
that are at least as good as the present one. Definitions for
relation properties are provided, and it is postulated that 
is a preorder, i.e. reflexive and transitive (Lines 16–19).
Subsequently, the σ-type lifted logical connectives of PL
are introduced as abbreviations of λ-terms in the meta-logic
HOL (Lines 21–33). The operators 2 and 2≺ use  and
≺ as guards in their definitions (Lines 30–31). An univer-
sal modality and its dual are also introduced (Lines 32–33).
Moreover, a notion of (global) truth for PL formulas ψ is
defined (Line 35): proposition ψ is globally true, we also
say ‘valid’, if and only if it is true in all worlds.
As a first test some expected dualities of the modal oper-
ators are automatically proved (Lines 37–38).
Subsequently, the betterness ordering (resp.≺) is lifted
to a preference relation between PL propositions (sets of
worlds). Eight possible semantic definitions for such prefer-
ences are encoded in HOL (Lines 41–56). These are com-
plemented by eight syntactic definitions of the same binary
preferences stated within the object languagePL (Lines 57–
64).3 Intuitively, preferring proposition P over Q amounts
to preferring every P-state over every Q-state (≺AA), or at
least one P-state over every Q-state (EA or ≺AE). Each
of these non-trivial variants can be argued for, cf. (Benthem
et al. 2009). However, only EA and ≺AE satisfy the con-
ditions required for a logic of value aggregation (see the dis-
cussion in §5). Transitivity, a quite controversial property in
the literature on preferences, is satisfied by ≺AE but not by
EA. Our framework can support both modeling options.
In line with the LogiKEy methodology, such a choice is left
at the discretion of the modeler.
We further extend the propositional logic PL as defined
by van Benthem et al. (2009) by adding quantifiers (Lines
66–69).4 Moreover, polymorphic operators for subset, union
and intersection are defined (Lines 71–73).
The model finder Nitpick (Blanchette and Nipkow 2010)
confirms the consistency of the introduced theory (Line 75)
by generating and presenting a model for it (not shown here).
To gain practical evidence for the faithfulness of our SSE
of PL in Isabelle/HOL, and also to assess proof automation
performance, we have conducted numerous experiments in
which we automatically reconstruct meta-theoretical results
on PL; see Figs. 10 and 11 in Appx. A.2.
5 Encoding the Value Ontology
The next, essential step is to model and encode the “Dis-
coursive Grammar” value ontology. The current status of
3ATP systems can prove the meta-theoretic correspondences of
these definitions; see Lines 5–13 in Fig. 10 in Appx. A.2.
4See Benzmu¨ller and Paulson (2013) for a discussion of the
SSE of quantified modal logics.
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Figure 4: Encoding of the Value Ontology
our modeling efforts is illustrated in the Isabelle/HOL the-
ory displayed in Fig. 4. Similar to before, this modeling may
be subject to further modifications. In fact, what is presented
here is the result of several cycles of modeling, encoding
and testing activities, in which previous versions have been
refuted and rejected or further improved.
As a preliminary, the legal parties ‘plaintiff’ and ‘defen-
dant’ are introduced as an (extensible) two-valued datatype
together with a function to obtain for a given party the other
one (x−1) (Lines 6–7); and a predicate modeling the ruling
for a party is also provided (Lines 9–10).
As regards to Lomfeld’s upper value ontology, a four-
valued (parameterized) datatype is introduced (Lines 12–
13) as described in §2. Moreover, type-aliases (Lines 14–
15) and set-constructor operators for values (Lines 17–18)
are introduced for ease of presentation. The legal principles
from §2 are next introduced as combinations of those upper
values (Lines 20–31). As an illustration, the principle stabil-
ity (STAB) is understood as instantiation of the upper value
Figure 5: Testing the Value Ontology
security coalesced with utility (in that order of importance).5
After defining legal principles as combinations (in this
case: sets) of values (w.r.t. a legal party), we need to re-
late them to propositions (sets of worlds/states) in our logic
PL. For this we reuse some basic notions from the the-
ory of Formal Concept Analysis (FCA) (Ganter and Wille
2012). We define a binary incidence relation (Line 34) be-
tween worlds/states (type i) and upper values (type VAL),
which is used to link propositions (sets of worlds) with cor-
responding sets of values (their intension) by means of the
operator ↑ (Line 35). More important to our purposes: each
legal principle (set of values) is associated with a proposition
(its extension) by means of the operator ↓ (Line 36).6
Intuitively, we can read the proposition denoted by
STABp↓ as: “a decision in favor of the plaintiff (p) promotes
the principle of stability”. Value-inconsistency (INCONS)
is given when all four upper values apply for the same legal
party (Lines 49–50). Further shorthand notation for value
aggregation is introduced (Lines 39–43).
The preference relation≺ utilized in the remainder is cho-
sen to be the EA-variant from §4 (Line 46–47). As men-
tioned before, the (better-known, transitive) ≺AE-variant is
also suitable for our logic of value preferences. The results
presented are valid for both (unless otherwise stated).
Testing the Value Ontology
In order to test the adequacy of our modeling, some implied
and non-implied knowledge is studied. This is shown in
Fig. 5. We briefly discuss some of the conducted tests.
Following a conflictual dialectical interpretation of the
value ontology, promoting values (for the same party) from
two opposing quadrants, say RESP & STAB or RELI &
WILL (cf. Fig. 1), is provably ‘value-inconsistent’ (IN-
CONS); theorem provers quickly confirm this (Lines 5-6).
However, promoting values from two non-opposed quad-
5At this early stage of our modeling we have not yet considered
this additional factor of relative importance or weight between val-
ues. Doing this would allow us to clearly distinguish, e.g., stability
(STAB) from efficiency (EFFI) among others.
6FCA exhibits a perfect duality between the pairs of notions:
object/attribute and extension/intension. Our choice to consider
worlds as objects and values as their attributes (i.e. propositions as
extensions of legal principles) bears no mathematical significance.
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Figure 6: Satisfying model for the statement in Line 12 of Fig. 5.
rants, such as WILL & STAB (Line 8) is value-consistent:
the model finder Nitpick computes and reports a counter-
model (not shown here) to the stated conjecture. Value-
inconsistency is also not implied if values from opposing
quadrants are promoted for different parties (Lines 10–11).
Remark on model finder Nitpick (Blanchette and Nipkow
2010): Nitpick searches for, respectively enumerates, finite
models or countermodels to a conjectured statement/lemma.
By default Nitpick searches for countermodels, and model
finding is enforced by stating the parameter keyword ‘sat-
isfy’. In Line 12 of Fig. 5, for example, Nitpick is called
simultaneously in both modes in order to confirm the con-
tingency of the statement; as expected both a model (Fig. 6)
and countermodel for the statement is returned. These mod-
els are given as concrete interpretations of relevant terms in
the given context so that the conjectured statement is satis-
fied or falsified (depending of the mode of Nitpick). Study-
ing and analysing the returned interpretations can be very
helpful and intuition-fostering for the user, in particular, in
very complex modeling tasks when intuition and deep un-
derstanding of the modeled structures is initially lacking.
Note that the notion of value-inconsistency (INCONS),
cf. Lines 49–50 in Fig. 4, has deliberately not been aligned
with inconsistency in meta-logic HOL so that it can be ex-
plicitly reasoned with (avoiding explosion). That means,
that we can contingently promote conflicting values such
as RELI and WILL for p, and this then leads to value-
inconsistency (for p) but not to general inconsistency in
meta-logic HOL. In Line 12 this contingency is confirmed.
However, inspecting the satisfying models generated by Nit-
pick, we see that p is indeed value-inconsistent. One of
such models is depicted in Fig. 6, where it is shown that
(in the given possible world i1) the upper values EQUAL-
ITY, SECURITY, UTILITY and FREEDOM are simultane-
ously promoted for p, this amounts to value-inconsistency
(INCONS) according to our definition.
Such model structures as computed by Nitpick are ideally
communicated-to and inspected-with domain experts (Lom-
feld in our case) early on and checked for plausibility, which
in case of issues then triggers adaptions of the defining ax-
ioms. Such a process may require several cycles (remember
the discussion from §3) and, as a useful side effect, it clearly
fosters cross-disciplinary mutual understanding.
Further tests in Fig. 5 assess the suitability of the pref-
erence relation ≺v (either ≺AE or EA) for reasoning
e.g. with value aggregations. For example, we test for a cor-
rect behavior when ‘strengthening’ the right-hand side: if
STAB is preferred over WILL, then STAB combined with,
say, RELI is also preferred over WILL alone (Line 14). Sim-
ilar test are conducted for ‘weakening’ of the left-hand side.
6 General Legal & World Knowledge
The realistic modeling of concrete legal cases requires fur-
ther legal & world knowledge (LWK) to be taken into ac-
count. LWK is typically modeled in so called “upper” and
“domain” ontologies. The question about which particular
notion belongs to which category is difficult, and apparently
there is no generally agreed answer in the literature. Any-
how, we present in Fig. 7 only a small and monolithic exam-
ple theory called “GeneralKnowledge” for illustration. In
our case this includes a small excerpt of a much simplified
“animal appropriation taxonomy”. Moreover, we associate
“animal appropriation” (kinds of) situations with the value
preferences they imply (conditional preference relations).
In a realistic setting this knowledge base would be fur-
ther split and structured similarly to other legal or general
ontologies, e.g., in the Semantic Web. Note, however, that
the expressiveness in our approach, unlike in many other
legal ontologies or taxonomies, is by no means limited to
definite underlying (but fixed) logical language foundations.
We could thus easily decide for a more realistic modeling,
e.g. avoiding simplifying propositional abstractions. For in-
stance, the proposition “appWildAnimal”, representing the
appropriation of one or more wild animals, can anytime be
replaced by a more complex formula.
Next steps include interrelating certain notions in our the-
ory “GeneralKnowledge” with values, resp. value prefer-
ences, as introduced in the previous sections. It is here where
the preference relations and modal operators ofPL are used.
Remember that, at a later point and in line with the LogiKEy
methodology, we may in fact exchange PL by an alternative
choice of a preference logic, or we may replace our current
material implication operator by a conditional implication to
better support defeasible legal reasoning.7
A general problem of knowledge representation frame-
works and ontology languages often is their insufficient sup-
port for the proper treatment of modalities, see e.g. the dis-
cussion and solution proposed by Benzmu¨ller and Pease
(2012). Our framework, which is based on that proposed
solution, is not suffering from such restrictions.
We briefly explain below the Isabelle/HOL encoding of
our LWK as shown in Fig. 7.
First, some non-logical constants that stand for kinds of
legally relevant situations (here: of appropriation) are intro-
duced (Lines 6–9), and their meaning is constrained by some
postulates (Lines 12–17). As already discussed, for ease of
illustration, these terms are modeled here as simple proposi-
tional constants. In practice, however, they may later be re-
placed, or logically implied, by a more realistic and suitable
7Indeed a (cautiously-monotonic) conditional implication can
be defined employing PL modal operators. We may also opt for
an SSE of a conditional logic in HOL, see e.g. Benzmu¨ller (2013).
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Figure 7: Encoding of general legal & world knowledge
modeling utilizing arbitrarily complex (even higher-order, if
needed) formulas depicting states of affairs to some desired
level of granularity. Some simple vocabulary and taxonomic
relationships (here: for wild and domestic animals) are spec-
ified (Lines 28–40) to illustrate this.
The legal default rules for several situations (here: appro-
priation of animals) are formulated as prima facie preference
relations (Lines 21–24). For example, one rule R2 (Line
23) could be read as: “In a wild-animals-appropriation kind
of situation, a decision promoting STAB in favor of a party
(say, the plaintiff) is preferred over a decision, favoring the
other party (defendant), which promotes WILL”. If there is
no more specific legal rule from a precedent or a codified
statute then these prima facie preference relations determine
the result. As a didactic example, the legal rule R4 (Line
58) states that the ownership (say, the plaintiff’s) of the land
on which the hunting took place, together with the fact that
the opposing party (defendant) acted out of malice implies a
value preference of reliance and responsibility over stability,
cf. §2. This reflects the Common law precedent of Keeble v.
Hickergill (1704, 103 ER 1127).
An established AI & Law tool to structure the represen-
tation of legal precedents are situational “factors” (Ashley
1990; Prakken and Sartor 2015). Some of them are specified
as illustration (Lines 44–48), together with some postulates
constraining their meaning (Lines 51–53). Our framework
also allows us to introduce definitions for those factors for
which clear legal specifications exist. In our model, such
factors are further related to value principles and outcomes
(Lines 62–67). Our normative assignment here is widely in
accordance with classifications in the AI & Law literature
(Berman and Hafner 1993; Bench-Capon 2012).
Finally, the consistency of all axioms and rules provided
is confirmed by Nitpick (Line 70).
7 Proof of Concept – Case Study
We illustrate our reasoning framework by encoding the clas-
sic common law property case Pierson v. Post. In a nutshell:
Pierson killed and carried off a fox which Post already
was hunting with hounds on public land. The Court found
for Pierson (cf. Pierson v. Post, 1805, 3 Cai R 175).
The modeling is presented in Fig. 8. We have introduced
and interrelated some minimal vocabulary, e.g. to ”pursue”
and to ”capture” (Lines 6–14), needed to represent the case
facts as interpreted by the parties (Lines 19–20 for Pierson;
Lines 45–46 for Post). Their consistency with other postu-
lates from the previously introduced layers “GeneralKnowl-
edge” and “ValueOntology” (imported in Line 2) is verified
by generating a (non-trivial) model using Nitpick (Line 16).
The aforementioned decision of the court for Pierson was
justified by the majority opinion. The essential preference
relation in the case is implied in the idea that appropriation
of (free-roaming) wild animals requires actual corporal pos-
session. The manifest corporal link to the possessor cre-
ates legal certainty, which is represented by the value stabil-
ity (STAB) and outweighs the mere will to possess (WILL)
by the plaintiff; cf. the arguments of classic lawyers cited
by the majority opinion: “pursuit alone vests no property”
(Justinian), and “corporal possession creates legal certainty”
(Pufendorf). According to the legal value ontology in §2,
this corresponds to a preference for the (upper) value SECU-
RITY over FREEDOM. We can see that this legal rule R2,
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as previously introduced in the layer “GeneralKnowledge”
(see Fig. 7, Line 23) is indeed employed by Isabelle/HOL
automated tools to prove (Lines 31–32) that the given facts
imply a preference for a decision for Pierson over one for
Post. Notice that the legal precedent rule R4 of Keeble v.
Hickergill (see Fig. 7, Line 58) does not apply to this case.
We also present and model a possible counterargument
for Post claiming an interpretation (i.e. a distinction in case
law methodology) in that the animal, being vigorously pur-
sued (with large dogs and hounds) by a professional hunter,
is not “free-roaming” as such (Line 45–46). Moreover, an
alternative legal rule (i.e. a possible argument for overrul-
ing in case law methodology) is presented (Lines 42–43),
entailing a value preference of efficiency (EFFI) over sta-
bility (STAB), and justified by the alleged public benefit of
hunters getting rid of foxes, since the latter cause depreda-
tions in farms. This is the argument put forward by the dis-
senting opinion in the original case (3 Cai R 175). Other
tests, i.e. consistency of both decision alternatives with the
given premises and with the value-consistency of both par-
ties (Lines 48–54) and refutability of a possible decision fa-
voring Pierson (Lines 61–62), are analogous (but contrary)
to Pierson’s argument.
8 Conclusion
Contributions and preliminary results of an ongoing project
have been presented in which a “discursive grammar” value
ontology in combination with further legal and general
world knowledge is being utilized for a detailed, granular
assessment and explanation of legal argumentation as partly
controversial legal balancing in a concrete case.
From a technical perspective, the core objective of this pa-
per has been to demonstrate that the technology we promote
and apply—shallow semantical embeddings (SSEs) in clas-
sical higher-order logic (HOL)—appears indeed suitable for
the task of structured legal balancing. It is the flexibility of
the multi-layer modeling which is unique in our approach,
in combination with a very rich support for expressiveness,
quantified classical and non-classical logics, thereby reject-
ing the idea that knowledge representation means should or
must be limited a priori to propositional frameworks due
only to computational considerations.
From a legal perspective, the reconstruction of legal bal-
ancing is already with classical argumentative tools a non-
trivial task which is methodologically not settled at all
(Sieckmann 2010). Here, our paper proposed the structuring
of legal argumentation with a dialectical ethico-legal value
ontology. Legal rules and their various interpretations could
thus be displayed within a unified pluralistic logic of value
preference relations. The integration of the preference logic
and the value ontology within the dynamic HOL modeling
environment allows to experiment with different forms of
interpretation. This enables not only to find more accurate
reconstructions of legal argumentation but also supports to
aggregate legal arguments and check their normative (value)
consistency. We aim at expanding the model towards pro-
portional preference relations which would allow to inte-
grate qualitative and quantitative legal balancing approaches
and to evaluate their relative strength.
Figure 8: Modeling the Pierson v. Post case.
The suitable, reusable, paradox-free modeling of ethico-
legal balancing as presented here is partly an art and partly
a challenging engineering task. Combining both aspects in
a holistic approach within a dynamic modeling framework,
we hope to contribute to the evolution of legal reasoning and
to pave the way for some form of (legally) reasonable ma-
chines.
8
Acknowledgements: Will be included in the final docu-
ment.
References
Alexy, R., ed. (1978). Theorie der juristischen Argumenta-
tion. Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp.
– (2000). “On the Structure of Legal Principles”. In: Ratio
Juris 13, pp. 294–304.
– (2003). “On Balancing and Subsumption: A Structural
Comparison”. In: Ratio Juris 16, pp. 433–449.
Ashley, K. D. (1990). Modelling Legal Argument: Reason-
ing with Cases and Hypotheticals. Cambridge/MA: MIT
Press.
Bench-Capon, T. (2012). “Representing Popov v Hayashi
with dimensions and factors”. In: Artificial Intelligence
and Law 20, pp. 15–35.
Bench-Capon, T., K. Atkinson, and A. Chorley (2005). “Per-
suasion and value in legal argument”. In: Journal of Logic
and Computation 15, pp. 1075–1097.
Bench-Capon, T. and G. Sartor (2003). “A model of legal
reasoning with cases incorporating theories and value”.
In: Artificial Intelligence 150, pp. 97–143.
Benthem, J. van, P. Girard, and O. Roy (2009). “Everything
Else Being Equal: A Modal Logic for Ceteris Paribus
Preferences”. In: J. Philos. Log. 38.1, pp. 83–125.
Benzmu¨ller, C. (2013). “Automating Quantified Conditional
Logics in HOL”. In: IJCAI-13. Ed. by F. Rossi. AAAI
Press, pp. 746–753.
– (2019). “Universal (Meta-)Logical Reasoning: Recent
Successes”. In: Sci. Comp. Progr. 172, pp. 48–62.
Benzmu¨ller, C. and B. Lomfeld (2020). “Reasonable Ma-
chines: A Research Manifesto”. Preprint: https://dx.doi.
org/10.13140/RG.2.2.28918.63045.
Benzmu¨ller, C., X. Parent, and L. van der Torre (2020).
“Designing Normative Theories for Ethical and Legal
Reasoning: LogiKEy Framework, Methodology, and Tool
Support”. In: Artificial Intelligence. Doi: https://doi.org/
10.1016/j.artint.2020.103348.
Benzmu¨ller, C. and L. C. Paulson (2013). “Quantified Mul-
timodal Logics in Simple Type Theory”. In: Logica Uni-
versalis 7.1, pp. 7–20.
Benzmu¨ller, C. and A. Pease (2012). “Higher-order Aspects
and Context in SUMO”. In: Journal of Web Semantics 12-
13, pp. 104–117.
Berman, D. and C. Hafner (1993). “Representing teleolog-
ical structure in case-based legal reasoning: the missing
link”. In: Proceedings 4th ICAIL. New York: ACM Press,
pp. 50–59.
Blanchette, J. C. and T. Nipkow (2010). “Nitpick: A Coun-
terexample Generator for Higher-Order Logic Based on
a Relational Model Finder”. In: ITP 2010. Vol. 6172.
LNCS. Springer, pp. 131–146.
Dung, P. M. (1995). “On the acceptability of arguments and
its fundamental role in nonmonotonic reasoning, logic
programming, and n-person games”. In: Artificial Intel-
ligence 77, pp. 321–357.
Fuenmayor, D. and C. Benzmu¨ller (2019a). “A
Computational-Hermeneutic Approach for Conceptual
Explicitation”. In: Model-Based Reasoning in Science
and Technology. Inferential Models for Logic, Language,
Cognition and Computation. Vol. 49. SAPERE. Springer,
Cham, pp. 441–469.
– (2019b). “Harnessing Higher-Order (Meta-)Logic to Rep-
resent and Reason with Complex Ethical Theories”.
In: PRICAI 2019: Trends in Artificial Intelligence.
Vol. 11670. LNAI. Springer, Cham, pp. 418–432.
Ganter, B. and R. Wille (2012). Formal concept analysis:
mathematical foundations. Springer Berlin.
Gordon, T. and D. Walton (2012). “A Carneades reconstruc-
tion of Popov v Hayashi”. In: Artificial Intelligence and
Law 20, pp. 37–56.
Hage, J. (1997). Reasoning With Rules. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Hoekstra, R., J. Breuker, M. D. Bello, and A. Boer (2009).
“LKIF Core: Principled Ontology Development for the
Legal Domain”. In: Law, Ontologies and the Semantic
Web - Channelling the Legal Information Flood. Vol. 188.
Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications. IOS
Press, pp. 21–52.
Horty, J. (2011). “Rules and reasons in the theory of prece-
dent”. In: Legal Theory 17, pp. 1–33.
Liu, F. (2008). “Changing for the Better – Preference Dy-
namics and Agent Diversity”. PhD thesis. Inst. for Logic,
Language and Computation, Universiteit van Amsterdam.
Lomfeld, B. (2015). Die Gru¨nde des Vertrages: Eine
Diskurstheorie der Vertragsrechte. Tu¨bingen: Mohr
Siebeck.
– (2017). “Vor den Fa¨llen: Methoden soziologischer Ju-
risprudenz”. In: Die Fa¨lle der Gesellschaft: Eine neue
Praxis soziologischer Jurisprudenz. Ed. by Lomfeld.
Tu¨bingen: Mohr Siebeck, pp. 1–16.
– (2019). “Grammatik der Rechtfertigung: Eine kritische
Rekonstruktion der Rechts(fort)bildung”. In: Kritische
Justiz 52.4.
Nipkow, T., L. Paulson, and M. Wenzel (2002). Is-
abelle/HOL: A Proof Assistant for Higher-Order Logic.
Vol. 2283. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer.
Osherson, D. N. and S. Weinstein (2012). “Preference based
on Reasons”. In: Rev. Symb. Log. 5.1, pp. 122–147.
Prakken, H. and G. Sartor (2015). “Law and logic: A review
from an argumentation perspective”. In: Artificial Intelli-
gence 227, pp. 214–225.
Sartor, G. (2010). “Doing justice to rights and values: teleo-
logical reasoning and proportionality”. In: Artificial Intel-
ligence and Law 18, pp. 175–215.
– (2018). “A Quantitative Approach to Proportionality”. In:
Handbook of Legal Reasoning and Argumentation. Ed. by
B. et al. Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 613–636.
Sieckmann, J.-R., ed. (2010). Legal Reasoning: The Meth-
ods of Balancing. Vol. 124. ARSP Beiheft. Stuttgart:
Franz Steiner.
Teubner, G. (1983). “Substantive and Reflexive Elements in
Modern Law”. In: Law & Society Rev. 17, pp. 239–285.
9
A Appendix
A.1 Ceteris paribus preference relation for PL
Extending the SSE of PL in HOL from Fig. 3 some further
preference relations for PL are defined in Fig. 9. These ad-
ditional relations support ceteris paribus reasoning in PL.
Figure 9: SSE (cont’d) of PL (Benthem et al. 2009) in HOL
We give some explanations:
Lines 6–14 Useful set theoretic notions are introduced as
abbreviations for corresponding λ-terms in HOL.
Lines 16–24 PL is further extended with (equality-based)
ceteris paribus preference relations and modalities; here
Γ represents a set of formulas that are assumed constant
between two possible worlds to compare. Hence our
variant can be understood as “these (given) things being
equal”-preferences. This variant can be used for modeling
von Wright’s notion of ceteris paribus (“all other things
being equal”) preferences, eliciting an appropriate Γ by
extra-logical means.
Lines 29–40: Except for ≺ΓAA, the remaining operators we
define here are not explicitly defined in (Benthem et al.
2009); however, their existence is tacitly suggested.
A.2 Testing the Meta-Theory of PL
Meta-theoretical results onPL as presented by van Benthem
et al. (2009) are automatically verified by the reasoning tools
in Isabelle/HOL; see Figs. 10 and 11.
Figure 10: Experiments: Testing the meta-theory of PL
We briefly explain the experiments shown in Fig. 10:
Lines 5–13 Correspondences between the semantically and
syntactically defined preference relations are proved.
Lines 15–22 It is proved that (e.g. inclusion and interaction)
axioms for PL follow as theorems in our SSE. This tests
the faithfulness of the embedding in one direction.
Lines 25–47 We continue the mechanical verification of
theorems, and generate countermodels (not displayed
here) for non-theorems of PL, thus putting our encoding
to the test. Our results coincide with the corresponding
ones claimed (and in many cases proved) in Benthem et
al. (2009), except for the claims encoded in lines 41 and
42, where countermodels are reported by Nitpick.
Lines 25–47 Some application-specific tests in preparation
for the modeling of the value ontology are conducted.
Further tests are shown in Fig. 11 for the ceteris paribus
extension of PL; we automatically prove all the relevant re-
sults from Benthem et al. (2009).
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Figure 11: Experiments (cont’d): Testing the meta-theory of PL
A.3 Testing the Value Ontology
Some further tests on the modeling and encoding of the
value ontology are conducted; these tests are displayed in
Fig. 12. Among others, we verify that the pair of opera-
tors for extension (↓) and intension (↑), cf. Formal Concept
Analysis (Ganter and Wille 2012), constitute indeed a Galois
connection (Lines 7–19), and we carry out some further tests
on the value ontology (extending the ones presented in §5)
concerning value aggregation and consistency (Lines 24ff.).
Figure 12: Further testing of the value ontology
A.4 Modeling Conti v. ASPCA
Another illustrative case study we can model in our frame-
work is: Conti v. ASPCA (cf. 353 NYS 2d 288).
Chester, a parrot owned by the ASPCA, escaped and was
recaptured by Conti. The ASPCA found this out and re-
claimed Chester from Conti. The court found for ASPCA.
In this case, the court made clear that for domestic ani-
mals the opposite preference relation as the standard in Pier-
son’s case (cf. §7) applies (with a preference in this case
of FREEDOM over SECURITY, cf. §1). More specifically,
it was ruled that for a domestic animal it is sufficient that
the owner did not neglect or stopped caring for the animal,
i.e. give up the responsability for its maintenance (RESP).
This, together with ASPCA’s reliance (RELI) in the parrot’s
property, outweighs Conti’s corporal possession (STAB) of
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the animal. A (simplified) argument is reconstructed as fol-
lows:
Let α stand for the animal. p and d stand for ASPCA and
Conti respectively. ASPCA (p) argument goes like this:
1 ASPCA owned the parrot – (Prop p α).
2 The parrot escaped and was recaptured by Conti – (Cap-
ture d α).
3 However, ASPCA still cares for (recovering and main-
taining) the animal – (Care p α).
4 Therefore, ruling for ASPCA – (For p) is preferred (since
the combination of RELI & RESP is preferred to STAB
by legal rule R3, cf. §7).
The reconstructed theory for the Conti vs. ASPCA case is
displayed in Fig. 13.
Figure 13: Modeling of the Conti vs. ASPCA case
A.5 Complex (Counter-)Models
An example of a complex countermodel with four possible
worlds/states (type i) that has been computed by Nitpick for
the statement in Line 41 in Fig. 13 is presented in Fig. 14.
This countermodel is included here to illustrate (to the
interested reader) the richness of the information and the
level of detail that is supported in our framework. It is in
particular the combination of automated theorem proving,
model finding and countermodel finding that is supporting
the knowledge engineer and user of the LogiKEy framework
in a unique manner to gain intuition about the modeled struc-
tures. And, in fact, these three analysis modes can be worked
with in parallel in Isabelle/HOL. This is one reason for the
good response rates to user requests that we often experience
– despite the general undecidability of HOL.
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Figure 14: Example of a countermodel to the statement in Line 41 in Fig. 13
13
